


Africa Report

March, 1961



Wachuku of Nigeria, Chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission for Congo, exchanges views with the United Kingdom's Sir Andrew Cohen.
—United Nations photo

This Issue—

- Politics in French-Speaking Africa
- Nigeria's Youth Speaks Its Mind
- Communism in South Africa

Nigeria's Youth Speaks Its Mind

(This revealing interview with students at University College, Ibadan, may help to explain recent demonstrations in memory of Patrice Lumumba and against the defense pact with Britain.)

The five students came in bringing chairs and made themselves comfortable in the book-strewn dormitory room. They were polite but a bit wary. My wife and I had driven 90 miles from Lagos to University College on the outskirts of Ibadan in order to talk with them.

Outside the sun beat down with dazzling intensity on the school's handsome white buildings which were made to appear even whiter by the surrounding forest. Not far away this wall of green was pierced by the rooftops of a new housing development.

On the horizon was the skeletal transmitting tower of the Western Region's—and Africa's first—television network. Out of sight behind a ridge lay Ibadan, an immense, sprawling city of 600,000 people.

Four of the students were studying undergraduate physics. The fifth was doing graduate work in library science. One was president of the student council. Another edited the college weekly.

Defense Pact Protested

Two months earlier all five had abandoned their books for a day, and along with several hundred of their classmates had descended noisily on the federal house of parliament in Lagos to protest the signing of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact. Before the ensuing fracas with the police had run its course, one of the physicists and the librarian had deliberately allowed themselves to be arrested and carried away in a paddy wagon for a date next morning with a Lagos magistrate.

The pact, then, was a natural starting place for a discussion. As their initial reserve melted the students spoke freely and with a vehemence tempered by frequent assurance that their American visitors should take nothing they said personally. Here is some of what they said, reported as accurately as memory allows.

"The mere idea of a pact is inconsistent with the neutral role every African nation should play. It makes us look hypocritical and ridiculous because our leaders have told the world we will follow a policy of non-alignment as far as the power blocs are concerned."

"Signing a pact with Britain means aligning ourselves with America and NATO, too. During the Suez

crisis the British used our airbase at Kano. If de Gaulle and Abbas fail to reach an agreement, the West may use Kano to attack Algeria. The day will inevitably come when we find ourselves fighting at Britain's side against other Africans."

A gust of wind blew to the floor a leaflet announcing "regretfully," that the French acting troupe scheduled to appear on the campus the following week was cancelling its engagement because the Nigerian-French diplomatic break had made transportation impossible.

"The British are deceitful," one of the group continued. "They tell us they want to help us but in reality take advantage of our inexperience as a new nation to increase their military capacity. They want to keep an eye on us because they fear us."

"Once we have given them a base we'll never get them off our soil. Cuba gave America the naval base at Guantanamo, but when relations deteriorated America refused to leave. The same thing will happen here because if there is any country with which we will quarrel in the future it will be Britain."

And then as a brutal afterthought one student added, "Why should we tie ourselves to a declining power that is no longer able to defend even itself?"

"Africans are weary of being pushed around like pawns on your Cold War chessboard. You take it for granted that we lack intelligence to make our own decisions and shape our own future. Russia and America haven't yet realized that Africa does not need to decide between capitalism and Communism. There are alternatives and we can find them."

Peace Corps Rejected

"You Americans are the most obstinate people. You above all others should realize that Africa is not to be wooed like a child with no mind of its own. There is so much talk in the United States about winning Africa for the free world. Has it ever occurred to you that perhaps we don't want to be won, perhaps we don't regard your freedom as being particularly desirable?"

"Kennedy says he will send a peace corps to us, but to us this kind of peace means anti-Communism."

The five were in quick agreement that none wanted to have anything to do with President Kennedy's young emissaries from America.

"We are ready to receive your help, but help that comes from love, not pity. We don't want a patronizing pat on the back. We don't want your American superiority flaunted in our faces, because in fact we don't recognize this superiority."

"You must realize that when we talk like this it is not because we are pro-Communist. We want nothing to do with Communism. The Hungaries repel us. We have never looked to Moscow for leadership. We have looked to the West but you have disappointed us."

"We may disagree with some of Nkrumah's internal policies, but as far as projecting Africa to the world goes, he is the leader we most admire. Nkrumah was right when he said that Ghana will not be free until all of Africa is free. We begrudge every inch of African soil that remains under the control of the white man. All Africans are brothers with a common history of oppression and a common destiny of freedom."

"Africa has reached a stage where it must stand on its own." His voice edged with scorn, the editor continued, "The English and Americans tell me that I am not a human being until I learn to speak English and wear a white shirt and tie. But I am an African. I cannot be a carbon copy of a white man. Likewise, Africa has to express itself as a continent with integrity."

As they left, one turned in the doorway and said, "You know, Americans and Nigerians have one important trait in common. We both speak our minds."

—By Paul Conklin, from the *New Republic*

VOL. 6, NO. 3

AFRICA REPORT is published monthly at Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.

Cable: AFRAM, WASHINGTON

Editorial Staff: Helen Kitchen, Editor; Gayle Quisenberry, Editorial Assistant; Margaret O'Neill, Circulation; Harvey Glickman, Book Editor; Okon Idem, Library

Africa Report welcomes but cannot assume responsibility for unsolicited manuscripts.

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Articles in Africa Report are independently selected and edited by the editor and do not necessarily reflect the views of the African-American Institute.

Second Class postage paid at Washington, D. C. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: Surface mail: U. S. \$1.00; Foreign 8/. Air Rates: U. S. \$3.00; Foreign \$4.90.

How Seven States Were Born In Former French West Africa

By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN*

The 1958 Referendum was the turning-point in the postwar stride of French West Africa toward independence, for within two years all the West African states were sovereign nations. In this headlong race for independence, the balkanization of French West Africa has been re-emphasized, and this has led to the dislocation—at least temporarily—of those integrating political, trade union, and youth organizations which had once held it together.

Prior to the Referendum, there was one principal mass movement of French-speaking West Africa, the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA). The RDA held power in the Ivory Coast, Soudan, and Guinea; it shared power in Upper Volta and Dahomey; and it was the leading opposition movement in Niger. Furthermore, the main party in power in Niger was a breakaway from the original RDA. Only in Senegal (and in Mauritania, which is outside the scope of this article) was the RDA without significant influence. The other major political grouping in French West Africa, the *Parti de Regroupement Africain*, (PRA), was founded only in July 1958, two months before the Referendum, and was a coalition of many disparate forces. Had the Referendum not intervened, it is quite possible that the PRA would have gone the way of previous attempts to set up a counter-force to the RDA.

Labor and the RDA

On the trade union front, the *Union Generale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN) was ostensibly independent of all political parties, but the overwhelming majority of its leadership was very actively involved in the RDA. Indeed, the President of UGTAN, Sekou Toure, was also the leader of the RDA in Guinea. A large part of the leadership of the *Conseil de la Jeunesse d'Afrique*, (CJA), which grouped all significant youth forces in French West Africa, was also linked very closely to the RDA, although the CJA was, on the whole, more radical and embraced anti-RDA sentiment as well. In particular, the CJA leadership at the federal level was in the hands of Senegalese, all of whom were members of the then *Bloc Populaire Senegalais-PRA*. The two student groupings, the *Federation des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France* (FEANF) and the *Union Generale des Etudiants d'Afrique Occidentale*—had escaped for some time the

dominance of the RDA and were in control of persons affiliated with the *Parti Africain de l'Independance*, a small Marxist party, or the PRA, or without any party ties, but their direct political influence was negligible, except insofar as they influenced the CJA and UGTAN.

Communication Lacking


Thus, for all practical purposes, the RDA—or specifically its inter-territorial Committee of Coordination—was still the arbiter of the destiny of French-speaking West Africa at the time of the referendum. The fact that this body never met during the whole struggle over the attitude to be taken vis-a-vis the de Gaulle Referendum was one of the major reasons for the ultimate split within the RDA. This debate really began at the time of the RDA's September 1957 Third Inter-Territorial Congress in Bamako, where disagreements arose over the question of primary federations. Because the 1956 *loi-cadre* had devolved power not upon the Federation of French West Africa but upon the individual territorial governments, Senegal's Leopold Senghor and others were openly suspicious of a French attempt to "balkanize" Africa. The Ivory Coast, led by Felix Houphouet-Boigny, took quite the opposite view, emphasizing that the fight against French colonialism was not undertaken in order to cede Abidjan's powers to Dakar.

At the 1957 Congress, Houphouet-Boigny—leader of the inter-territorial RDA as well as of the Ivory Coast RDA—held the fort against the almost unanimous position of the other leaders of the RDA, who were for the immediate establishment of a strong federation of French West Africa which would enter into negotiations with France. The meeting ended with an ambiguous compromise calling for the "democratization of existing federal institutions." This saved the RDA, but only temporarily.

Between the Congress of 1957 and the de Gaulle Referendum, Houphouet strengthened his position within the RDA and thus was in a position to make his preference for a "yes" vote prevail. As part of the bargaining with other RDA leaders for this yes vote, he is said to have pledged, in a written document signed in the summer of 1958, that he would no longer oppose the principle of a federal government for French West Africa if the Referendum carried, and would be willing to cede some territorial powers to such a union. With this guarantee in writing, it was presumed there would be no trouble in obtaining



Celebration during Independence in
Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
—French Embassy Press & Information Division



agreement of all the RDA sections for a "yes" vote on the Referendum.

What happened subsequently has never become totally clear, but there are several elements to place within the picture. First, the middle level leadership of UGTAN (that is, those who were not themselves on the RDA Committee of Coordination), the leadership of the CJA, and the students all placed considerable pressure upon the RDA leaders, and in particular UGTAN President Sekou Toure, to vote "no" on the referendum. Secondly, Ouezzin Coulibaly—Political Secretary of the inter-territorial RDA, Prime Minister of Upper Volta, and the man who for a long time had been able through his personality and influence to reconcile Houphouet-Boigny and Sekou Toure—died in September 1958. Many say that if Ouezzin had lived, Sekou Toure would have responded to the appeal to maintain RDA unity at all costs for reasons of personal loyalty to Ouezzin. Others say, however, that Ouezzin himself would have voted "no" and would have brought Sekou Toure and perhaps others along with him.

A third element was the decision of Bakary Djibo, Prime Minister of Niger, to call for a "no" vote. Although Guinea leaders deny that this affected the Guinea position, it is a fact that Bakary Djibo announced his intention to vote "no" one day before Sekou Toure made a similar call. (Why Bakary Djibo did so is also not clear, except that he was under considerable pressure from his supporters. He has since stated that he did not expect the violent action of the French and the use of troops brought down from the Sahara to falsify the Referendum. The Niger vote, of course, was registered officially as an affirmative.)

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The key area at the time of the Referendum, it can be said in retrospect, was Soudan. Although the Soudanese leaders—by their own explanation—preferred the "no" position, they felt that such a vote would have been premature at the time because of the strength of the opposition *Parti Progressiste du Soudan*, supported by many chiefs and by the French administration. A "no" vote at that time would, they believe, have elicited the same kind of French counter-action which led to the overthrow of Bakary Djibo in Niger. According to Soudanese analysis, a call for a "no" vote was ruled out on the grounds that it would have set back independence many years and removed the RDA from power.

Guinea Critical of Soudan

This interpretation is not fully shared by the Guineans or the Bakary Djibo forces in Niger; the Guineans feel that Soudan made a political mistake and believe that their own subsequent isolation might have been less severe had the Soudan also voted "no". Furthermore, a "no" vote in Soudan might have affected the political balance in other territories—perhaps not sufficiently to achieve a general "no" vote, but at least to have prevented Houphouet from successfully urging the French boycott of Guinea following its independence. From the point of view of the Bakary Djibo forces, Soudan voted "yes" largely because the Soudanese RDA and in particular Modibo Keita were loyal beyond necessity to Houphouet. To the argument that what happened in Niger would have also happened in the Soudan, they say that France could not have pulled off such an operation in both territories simultaneously and that if both Niger and Soudan had gone forward together, it is quite possible that both would have been successful.

The two other major African political figures involved—Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny and Senegal's Leopold Senghor—had every reason to

vote "yes" on the Referendum. Both had for a long time advocated a policy of decolonization which would involve no radical rupture with France. The Referendum caused no inner conflict of conscience in the case of either of these men comparable to that of Modibo Keita or Sekou Toure or Bakary Djibo.

This, then, was the line-up of forces at the point of the Referendum: Sekou Toure's Guinea RDA, Bakary Djibo's Niger PRA (Sawaba Party), and the small Guinea PRA called for a "no" vote. All the other sections of the RDA and PRA in French West Africa came out for voting "yes". The Executive Committees of UGTAN, CJA, and FEANF all took a position in favor of the "no" vote on the referendum. The fact that they were not able significantly to affect the vote, even in the major urban centers, exposed the limitations of the trade union and youth movements in relation to the mass political struggles of the years following the Referendum.

• • •

The first political issue of the post-Referendum period was the Community's treatment of the Republic of Guinea. One of the major factors in the prolonged crisis between France and Guinea over recognition was the strong opposition of the Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny to any treatment of Guinea that would seem to be a reward rather than a punishment. Or, to put it the other way around, Houphouet insisted that the states which had voted "yes" be in some way concretely rewarded by receiving more advantageous treatment than a state that had voted "no", particularly insofar as economic assistance was concerned. Though neither Senegal's Leopold Senghor nor Soudan's Modibo Keita shared this reaction to the Guinean situation—indeed their attitude was rather that everything possible should be done to retain friendly relations with Guinea—their interventions were less effective in Paris than those of Houphouet in the other direction.

Guinea Isolated

Guinea, faced with the prospect of increasing isolation from its African neighbors as a result of the French policy, countered by developing new economic relationships with the Communist countries, and entering into the Ghana-Guinea union. Whatever the shortcomings of the union with Ghana, it must be remembered that it proved to be effective leverage: it was followed very promptly by the long-delayed French-Guinea accord establishing Guinea's right to continue in the franc zone. Isolation led Guinea to take a vigorous proselytizing position vis-a-vis other French African states, pursuing its policy of subverting the Community with perhaps

(Continued on page 7)

The Communist Party in South Africa

By a Special Correspondent

To understand the real and potential strength in the underground Communist Party of South Africa requires a comprehension—which few whites possess—of the depth of African suffering, the range of African aspirations, and the complexity of African politics in the land of apartheid.

In South Africa, the Communists have in fact (1) controlled most of the key positions in the oldest and most respected African organization, the African National Congress, at least since the early 1950's, (2) been able to form a variety of effective front groups, and (3) publish several publications, one of them widely read. Despite this apparatus, and the advantage of having several hundred whites available to use their freedom of movement for the cause, the Communists do not set the pace of African resistance in South Africa.

This is because their tactics, unlike their ultimate goal, are quite conservative. The Communists know that they cannot, with some 2500 members and no arms, handle a revolution, and consequently they do not seek one now.

Thus it was that the rival to the Communist-penetrated African National Congress—the militant non-Communist Pan-Africanist Congress called the demonstrations that led to the emergency in South Africa last March. As almost anywhere else in Africa, the "moderate" who urges caution has lost the initiative to the group that thinks it can effect freedom now.

The Communists are far from licked, however, and an understanding of non-white politics in the Union requires a knowledge of how they have gained and used their considerable strength.

Historical Context Important

The Communist Party of South Africa was founded in 1921 by a few whites who combined zeal for the rights of the African with a background of trade unionism, especially in the mines. The party strongly supported the bloody Rand strike of 1922, and for a time had white Afrikaner miners singing Communist anthems. But with the rise of the Labor Party to power between the wars, white labor transferred its loyalties, and the Communists lost influence. Party officials continued to make occasional trips to Russia, the party line was fairly tightly controlled from Moscow, and Communists occasionally won municipal and parliamentary seats until after World War II, but the party was generally stagnant.

With the banning of the party in 1952, the Communists turned their attention increasingly to non-white

groups, concentrating especially on the old and respected African National Congress of Chief Albert Luthuli.

The method by which the Communists came to dominate the ANC is familiar enough to students of Communist techniques, but widely misunderstood in South Africa. Many whites in the Union are convinced that all African political leaders are Communist—which is, of course, patently untrue. Many Africans argue, with equal naivete, that the 25,000-member ANC could not possibly be Communist-controlled if the total Communist complement in the party is no more than 1,000 or 1,250.

Infiltration Preferred

Communist control of the ANC has been achieved through infiltration rather than ideological pressure: about 60 to 80 percent of the ANC executive are dedicated Communists. The ANC president-general, Chief Albert Luthuli is perhaps the single most certainly non-Communist African in the ANC, but he has never moved internally against the Communists. Convinced that his mission is to unite his people at all costs, Luthuli has been reluctant to take any steps which produce fissures among Africans. He was built up by the Communists and has been to a great extent a captive of them, but it would be extremely difficult for them to remove him if they wanted to.

The Communists have further shackled the ANC, despite its overwhelmingly non-Communist membership, by entering it into a coalition called the Congress Alliance. This alliance, which plans joint campaigns, functions through a committee on which the much larger ANC holds equal representation with four other participating groups—all minor front organizations in which the Communists have considerably more certain control than in the ANC. These are the white Congress of Democrats (COD), the multi-racial South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the South African Coloured Peoples' Organization (SACPO), and the Indian National Congress.

Despite this control mechanism, the Communists consistently underplay their hand, and their overall influence in non-white politics is subtle and vague. None of the Congress groups are given to heavy-handed statements on international matters, and their comments on domestic affairs are rarely identifiably Communist. Rather they are egalitarian. Most of the identification of Communist influence depends on knowledge of the individuals, of their own past histories and

travels, and on the circumstances that created their organizations, rather than on the identification of a palpably left-wing statement or policy.

This makes it difficult to get African attention on the subject, for to most Africans the immediate problems of apartheid and poverty are more pressing than the long-range question of Communism. Some of them scarcely even believe in it as a force in their own country; others declare their impatience by saying that if they had to make such a choice, they would prefer Communism to apartheid.

What is the Communist Goal?

There is considerable debate among critics as to what the Communists' aspirations in South Africa really are and how they hope to achieve them. The Moscow line has changed from time to time in the past, particularly in regard to racial cooperation in the Union—i.e., whether South Africa shall be an African or a multi-racial state. At present, of course, the Communists function through the multi-racial Congress alliance. But their avowed goal is liberation for the "subject people." This approach is not at this time in conflict with the views of the genuine African Nationalist leaders, who accept that good men of all races must campaign together for the economic and political emancipation of the non-white population.

The Communist Party Apparatus

The Communist apparatus in the Union is tight and efficient. At the top, and distinct from the Congress leadership (though some of its members doubtless coincide), is the CP executive committee, functioning so skillfully that the South African Government's erratic Special Branch has never uncovered much detail of its meetings since it went underground in 1952. This committee is controlled by white members, and makes the basic policy decisions for the party. At the provincial level the control is again white.

The Communists control the third most popular of the publications available in the Union for non-whites, the weekly *New Age*. *New Age* has twice been banned, only to reappear under a new name, and was suppressed again during the 1960 emergency. With an audited circulation fluctuating annually between 13,000 and 19,000, *New Age* is now edited by Brian Bunting, son of the late S. P. Bunting, one of the founders of the Communist Party in South Africa.

Besides *New Age*, and other publications such as *Fighting Talk* and *Liberation*, the Communists spread their influence through the South African Congress of Trade Unions, which controls the few significant

African trade unions, of which the most important is the Food and Canning Workers' Union. (African unions are not legally recognized in South Africa, and thus they do not have the right to strike.) SACTU enables the Communists to organize politically among the Africans while ostensibly organizing only for trade union purposes. The Communists have given much time and attention to SACTU in recent years, and its secretary, an African, Leslie Massina, has studied behind the Iron Curtain.

The Congress Alliance

The well-organized Indian National Congress receives some financial support from non-Communist Indian businessmen in the Union, but its executive is apparently Communist-dominated.

The South African Coloured Peoples' Organization is much less significant. The coloured (i.e., mixed) people are the least political of all South African racial groups, and they most desire to be accepted by the whites. Liberal Afrikaners are forever calling them "adjuncts to the white race." The effective membership of SACPO probably does not reach more than 200 out of a total coloured population in the Union of some 1,360,000.

The Congress of Democrats has a membership of about 300 whites, and this includes some non-Communists who honestly find it the most outspoken of all the anti-apartheid groups open to them. It was formed about the time the Communist Party was banned, and is strongest in Johannesburg and Cape Town. The Communists use the whites because they are amenable to party discipline, have more money available, and can move more easily in and out of South Africa. And the alliance of organizations does give a useful facade of racial unity in the fight against apartheid.

How do the Communists win adherents among Africans? Some genuinely believe the gospel of Marxism. For others, it is more that the Communist Party offers a home for the intellectual African who finds that there he is really treated as an equal by whites. He may recall that the Communists spoke up for the African long before World War II while the other opposition groups, such as the Liberals and the Progressive Party, are newcomers. For some Africans, introduction to the party may have come through a party member finding a man a job or clothes or food. The Communists have worked hard to win friends and influence people.

In recent years, however, a challenge to Communist domination developed among Africans, a challenge that was hard to advance without seeming to oppose the unity the Africans know they must have to get anywhere against the *laager* of Afri-

kanerdom. This was the Africanist movement, which developed in the late 1950's into the Pan-Africanist Congress, officially founded in 1959.

The white English-language press of South Africa has portrayed the PAC as an anti-white revolt against the multi-racial ANC. While simple racialism is one factor in the development of the Pan-Africanist Congress, it must also be viewed as a revolt against the way the Communists used the power they had gained within the African National Congress. The racial argument against the ANC was expressed either bluntly ("African politicians ought to aim to force the whites from the country"), or more circumspectly ("whites are dictating the policies of the ANC, which should in fact be run by Africans.")

Only rarely do Africans express direct opposition to the role of the Communists in the ANC publicly, because of fear that it will provide the government with ammunition against African nationalism as a whole and also because it is very hard to find specific examples of where the Communists acted differently than "pure" African nationalists would have acted.

Impatience with the ANC

Many joined the PAC in direct protest against the lack of dynamism in the ANC. For the ANC under Luthuli has been a very peaceful organization, a group whose leaders would not take stands that would send them to jail. Since the defiance campaign of 1952-53, it had done very little indeed. On at least one occasion, Luthuli wanted to defy a ban on a speech and be jailed for it, but the Communists in the ANC executive dissuaded him. The few ANC campaigns which did come off were very sloppily organized, particularly the boycott of "Nationalist-made" products in 1959, a dismal failure. This performance record convinced many Africans and other observers that the Communists in South Africa were not real revolutionaries, and that their objective was to hold control of the Africans and their organizations until some future time, when they would be strong enough to launch (and control) a successful revolution.

Rivalry Intensifies

When the PAC called the successful anti-pass campaign in March, the ANC typically opposed it, and only after the slaughter at Sharpeville had solidified African support did the ANC leaders see they would have to go along or miss the boat completely. (Probably no such subtlety was in the mind of Luthuli himself, for his symbolic pass-burning was the act of a religious African nationalist.) In any case, the bitter competition between the Pan-Africanist Congress and the African National Congress in recent months indicates that the ANC has finally realized that the PAC, which probably surpassed its com-

WHAT'S HAPPENING TO PONDO DETAINEES?

Relatives Get No News From Police

The New Age, the Communist-line newspaper in South Africa with the largest circulation among Africans.

petitor in membership early in 1960, is now a real threat.

Since the emergency and the jailing of all key African leaders early in 1960, there has been very little overt political activity among non-whites in South Africa. The ANC has some shadow committees occasionally issuing leaflets, and a few leaders of each organization escaped and are now being relatively civil to each other overseas. They have joined to form the South African United Front, but the tensions among ex-members are very plain even behind the formal unity. Patrick Duncan, a Liberal and an outspoken anti-Communist, was briefly jailed for refusing to disclose the source of a rather vague editorial note in *Contact*, a note which asserted that there had been a reorganization of the Communist Party of South Africa.

It is difficult to predict how long it will take the Africans to regroup politically in South Africa in the aftermath of the widescale arrests of March 1960.

When it becomes possible for these groups to operate again, openly or furtively, the leaders of the African National Congress will almost certainly realize that they must compete with the Pan-Africanist Congress by offering some hope of a quicker solution to the burdens of the African than they have in the past. For it is clear that the Pan-Africanist Congress and its dynamic leader, Robert Sobukwe, have dealt a serious blow to the African National Congress and

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How Seven States Were Born in French West Africa

(Continued from page 4)

more vigor than it would otherwise have done.

Niger was another tense area in the post-Referendum period. The French, having intervened with troops and money to bring about a victory in the Referendum, were now determined to eliminate Bakary Djibo's influence. Partly as a result of French machinations, Bakary Djibo was ousted. Traditional elements led by Issoufou Seydou Djermakoye, who had made an alliance with Bakary Djibo against the RDA of Hamani Diori in early 1957, split away at the time of the Referendum, thus preparing the way for the return to power of the RDA's Hamani Diori. It is significant, however, that in his attempt to maintain himself in power, Bakary Djibo was supported throughout by his old allies in the PRA—particularly Senegal's Leopold Senghor and Lamine Gueye—despite the fact that they had split over how to vote in the Referendum. Indeed, in the period immediately following the Referendum, Bakary Djibo was much closer to the Senegalese and Soudanese leaders than to Guinea.

Internal Tensions in Soudan

In Soudan, the ruling *Union Soudanaise* faced serious internal pressures in the months following the Referendum arising from the identification of the average Soudanese party member with Guinea's successful "no" vote. Both the rank and file and leaders deeply resented the French reaction to Guinea, as well as French machinations in Niger; in addition they were disillusioned with Houphouët-Boigny, for they felt that he had reneged on pre-Referendum promises, implicit and explicit, to establish a Federation of French West Africa. Determined to salvage their own position at home and abroad at all cost with the establishment of a federation, Soudanese leaders began to press almost immediately for the establishment of Mali. Mali, in Soudan's view, was to be the federation of French West Africa so long talked about; it was to mark the reintegration of PRA-governed Senegal into the rest of French West Africa, a split which went back to the first RDA regional meeting in 1946, and it was to mark the end of RDA unity under Houphouët-Boigny.

At the time of the 1957 meeting of the RDA in Bamako, all the RDA parties in French West Africa, with the exception of the Ivory Coast sector, were in favor of establishing a strong federal government for French West Africa. And so when the call went out to establish Mali, it might have been thought that all but the Ivory Coast would have re-

sponded. But much had happened between 1957 and the last months of 1958. Niger—where Hamani Diori had just come back to power with the help of Houphouët-Boigny, against the opposition of Senghor and Modibo Keita—lined up solidly with the Ivory Coast on the issue of Mali. Guinea, now outside the Community altogether, obviously could not be included in the federation. This not only narrowed the potential territorial spread of the federation, but also weakened those forces within the RDA which favored federation and put them at a disadvantage in the internal fight over the establishment of such a federation. Between the Soudan RDA, pressing militantly for federation, and the Ivory Coast RDA, strongly opposing it, were the uncertain RDA parties of Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Senegal.

Instability in Upper Volta

In Upper Volta, the death of RDA leader Ouezzin Coulibaly several weeks prior to the Referendum had initiated a struggle for the succession between Maurice Yameogo, a relatively recent recruit to the RDA, and Joseph Ouedreago, mayor of Ouagadougou and a leader of the Catholic Mossi groups from Ouagadougou who had fused with the old RDA elements of Bobo-Dioulasso to create the reinvigorated RDA party in Upper Volta in early 1957. Yameogo won this battle ultimately, but at the time when the controversy about joining Mali was uppermost, the power struggle was in full swing and Upper Volta was a mosaic of uncoordinated regional party leaders. Federalism or anti-federalism became a plaything of other older divisions, especially the geographic and ethnic Ouagadougou-Bobo split and the rivalries that stemmed from groupings around various personalities.

Upper Volta at first joined Mali and later left Mali because there was no principled position taken by anyone in Upper Volta on the question at this time. Yameogo's own position reflected the shifting tides of the Upper Volta internal struggle: aside from the political and economic pressure exerted on him by Houphouët and the French not to join Mali, Yameogo was influenced by a belief that the Soudanese and the Senegalese would tend to support within Upper Volta those elements who were opposed to Yameogo, and that participation in Mali would lead to his eventual loss of power within Upper Volta. Left to himself, Yameogo rightly judged that he could juggle the two major groups opposing his regime—the Joseph Ouedreago group, linked historically with Senegal's Senghor, and the militant RDA elements in Bobo, linked to the Soudan-

ese—sufficiently to remain on top.

The situation in Dahomey was even less clear-cut. Here there were three parties—(1) the RDD (*Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméenne*) in the north, which had no inter-territorial links and whose position on federation was characteristically opportunistic; (2) the UDD-RDA (*Union Démocratique Dahoméenne*), which had always had close ties to the Soudanese and shared their position on federation rather than the position of Houphouët-Boigny; and (3) Premier Sourou-Migan Apithy's *Parti des Nationalistes du Dahomey*, a fusion of Apithy's old *Parti Republicain du Dahomey* (which had been in power in Dahomey since 1946) with federalist elements led by Zinsou and Adande. When the call to Mali went out in December 1959, the Apithy-led government announced it would affiliate. However, the opposition RDA, as part of its counter-attack on the Apithy regime, allied with Houphouët against a Mali affiliation. Ivory Coast financial support for the RDA and French threats and promises to Apithy were largely responsible for Dahomey's failure to ratify the Mali agreement.

Senegal Opts for Mali

In Senegal, the RDA position was much simpler. The party was a small minority party led by Doudou Gueye and Gabriel d'Arboussier. Doudou Gueye, who had an electoral mandate in Guinea at the moment of the Referendum, was expelled from Guinea because of his position on the Referendum, but Doudou Gueye had been historically close to the Soudanese leaders and lined up with them at this point. D'Arboussier also went along, and the RDA opted for Mali. Since Mali was essentially an alliance between the Soudanese RDA and the Senegalese *Union Populaire Senegalaise*, the small Senegalese RDA simply integrated itself into the Senegalese UPS.


With the defection of Dahomey, and then Upper Volta, the Federation of Mali—which was meant to encompass the whole of French West Africa originally—was reduced to a bicephalous state, the union of Senegal and Soudan. To secure the base of Mali, a new political party was founded—the *Parti de la Fédération Africaine*. In the elections which each state held in the early days following the Referendum, there was much movement of party labels as each state tried to achieve internal unity. In Soudan, the opposition *Parti Progressiste du Soudan*, which had fought the RDA so bitterly for so many years, decided to integrate itself into the ruling party. A small

(Continued on page 12)



AFRICAN STUDENTS IN THE N



|  | | STUDENTS | | | | FINANCIAL SUPPORT * | | | | | | ACADEMIC STATUS | | | | MEDICAL SCIENCE <small>(includes pre-med.)</small> |
|--|---------|----------------|------|--------|--------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|------------------|----|---|
| | | TOTAL STUDENTS | MALE | FEMALE | NEW STUDENTS | US GOVERNMENT | FOREIGN GOVERNMENT | SELF-FINANCED | OTHER PRIVATE | US GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE COMBINED | FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE | UNDERGRADUATES | GRADUATES | SPECIAL STUDENTS | | |
| COUNTRY | YEAR | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| U.A.R. (Egyptian Zone) | 1959-60 | 490 | 416 | 74 | 159 | 20 | 127 | 95 | 97 | 4 | 15 | 110 | 359 | 21 | 4 | |
| | 1957-58 | 405 | 346 | 59 | 130 | 14 | 73 | 123 | 95 | 7 | 8 | 95 | 271 | 39 | 2 | |
| NIGERIA | 1959-60 | 258 | 244 | 14 | 92 | 17 | 41 | 44 | 88 | 2 | 5 | 148 | 79 | 31 | 3 | |
| | 1957-58 | 192 | 180 | 12 | 29 | 3 | 24 | 51 | 76 | 3 | 7 | 103 | 77 | 12 | 3 | |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 1959-60 | 181 | 151 | 30 | 73 | 2 | 14 | 50 | 70 | 11 | 6 | 85 | 89 | 7 | 2 | |
| | 1957-58 | 194 | 158 | 36 | 87 | 2 | 7 | 76 | 77 | 3 | 4 | 90 | 92 | 12 | 2 | |
| ETHIOPIA | 1959-60 | 170 | 155 | 15 | 69 | 25 | 67 | 9 | 18 | — | 7 | 74 | 66 | 30 | 1 | |
| | 1957-58 | 151 | 141 | 10 | 51 | 42 | 70 | 7 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 63 | 46 | 42 | 1 | |
| LIBERIA | 1959-60 | 170 | 126 | 44 | 51 | 15 | 79 | 23 | 15 | — | 3 | 108 | 39 | 23 | 2 | |
| | 1957-58 | 210 | 160 | 50 | 97 | 20 | 130 | 22 | 16 | 2 | 5 | 144 | 45 | 21 | 2 | |
| GHANA | 1959-60 | 167 | 152 | 15 | 55 | 19 | 52 | 11 | 51 | 4 | 2 | 90 | 53 | 24 | 1 | |
| | 1957-58 | 135 | 122 | 13 | 27 | 3 | 66 | 10 | 42 | — | 1 | 113 | 20 | 2 | 1 | |
| KENYA | 1959-60 | 156 | 136 | 20 | 93 | 14 | — | 17 | 90 | 5 | 1 | 118 | 23 | 15 | 1 | |
| | 1957-58 | 32 | 31 | 1 | 18 | 3 | — | 3 | 17 | 5 | — | 16 | 15 | 1 | — | |
| MOROCCO | 1959-60 | 59 | 47 | 12 | 37 | 37 | 2 | 5 | 6 | — | — | 35 | 6 | 18 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 16 | 13 | 3 | 9 | 5 | — | 5 | 5 | — | — | 9 | 5 | 2 | — | |
| SUDAN | 1959-60 | 53 | 52 | 1 | 26 | 25 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | — | 12 | 15 | 26 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 29 | 29 | — | 16 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 2 | — | 11 | 18 | — | — | |
| SIERRA LEONE | 1959-60 | 39 | 31 | 8 | 11 | — | — | 13 | 20 | — | — | 30 | 6 | 3 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 37 | 29 | 8 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 24 | — | — | 31 | 5 | 1 | — | |
| TANGANYIKA | 1959-60 | 36 | 29 | 7 | 20 | 4 | — | 3 | 22 | 2 | 1 | 24 | 7 | 5 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 11 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 2 | — | — | 9 | — | — | 7 | 3 | 1 | — | |
| TUNISIA | 1959-60 | 30 | 27 | 3 | 7 | 7 | — | 1 | 3 | — | — | 9 | 15 | 6 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | — | — | — | 2 | 3 | 1 | — | |
| UGANDA | 1959-60 | 29 | 22 | 7 | 13 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 3 | — | 15 | 9 | 5 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 21 | 17 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 3 | — | |
| LIBYA | 1959-60 | 27 | 26 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 1 | — | — | 9 | 11 | 7 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 17 | 17 | — | 7 | 10 | — | 2 | 3 | — | — | 7 | 2 | 8 | — | |
| OTHERS | 1959-60 | 94 | 84 | 10 | 48 | 20 | 2 | 22 | 29 | 1 | — | 43 | 35 | 16 | — | |
| | 1957-58 | 59 | 49 | 10 | 19 | 11 | 3 | 9 | 22 | 2 | 5 | 28 | 22 | 9 | — | |
| TOTAL | 1959-60 | 1959 | 1698 | 261 | 762 | 219 | 400 | 303 | 519 | 34 | 41 | 910 | 812 | 237 | 18 | |
| | 1957-58 | 1515 | 1306 | 209 | 535 | 128 | 382 | 326 | 410 | 27 | 37 | 731 | 630 | 154 | 18 | |

* Some students did not report these particulars.

** Some students reported two fields of study.

UNITED STATES

More than 2,000 African students are enrolled in United States colleges and universities for the 1960-61 academic year, and the tide will increase in 1961-62. Until now, because of the lack of coordination among the myriad organizations sponsoring these various students, statistics have been very hard to come by. The following chart, compiled from figures made available to *Africa Report* by the Institute of International Education in New York, analyzes the African student component of US colleges through 1959-60 — the last year for which full data are available.

| STATUS | | FIELDS OF STUDY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------|---|-------------|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|--------------------------|--------------|
| | SPECIAL STUDENTS | MEDICAL SCIENCE (Includes pre-med, nurses training, pharmacy, medicine and dentistry) | AGRICULTURE | BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION | EDUCATION | CIVIL ENGINEERING | MECH. ENGINEERING | OTHER ENGINEERING | THEOLOGY | LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE | OTHER HUMANITIES | BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES | CHEMISTRY | OTHER SCIENCES | ECONOMICS | OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES | OTHER FIELDS |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | 39 | 40 | 11 | 48 | 54 | 19 | 24 | 38 | 7 | 25 | 40 | 23 | 34 | 29 | 20 | 56 | 22 |
| | | 24 | 23 | 30 | 41 | 12 | 19 | 43 | 6 | 17 | 38 | 20 | 25 | 19 | 18 | 50 | 20 |
| 31 | 12 | 35 | 10 | 9 | 22 | 9 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 8 | 17 | 26 | 9 | 9 | 22 | 42 | 19 |
| | | 36 | 16 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 11 | 16 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 34 | 5 |
| 7 | 12 | 23 | 10 | 12 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 30 | 6 | 17 | 12 | 6 | 14 | 5 | 19 | 3 |
| | | 25 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 16 | 40 | 4 | 19 | 12 | 5 | 11 | 4 | 18 | 2 |
| 30 | 42 | 11 | 5 | 21 | 20 | 15 | 4 | 10 | 5 | 4 | 18 | 6 | — | 12 | 13 | 19 | 7 |
| | | 10 | 7 | 8 | 15 | 16 | 6 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 10 | 34 | 5 |
| 23 | 21 | 20 | 13 | 20 | 20 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 4 | — | 14 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 26 | 23 |
| | | 24 | 18 | 20 | 30 | 9 | 3 | 13 | 3 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 2 | 7 | 9 | 30 | 12 |
| 24 | 2 | 17 | 19 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 12 | 15 | 4 | 12 | 11 | 22 | 7 |
| | | 15 | 16 | 9 | 1 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 5 | — | 11 | 12 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 26 | 2 |
| 15 | 1 | 12 | 2 | 13 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 7 | — | 7 | 9 | 4 | 11 | 24 | 39 | 8 |
| | | 4 | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | — | 2 | 3 | — | 3 | 5 | 7 | — |
| 18 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 9 | — | 14 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 12 | 1 |
| | | — | — | 3 | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | 4 | — | — | — | 2 | 2 | 3 | — |
| 26 | — | 1 | 9 | — | 1 | 6 | 1 | 6 | — | 2 | 4 | 12 | — | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| | | — | 8 | 2 | — | 1 | 4 | 1 | — | — | — | 5 | — | 1 | 3 | 4 | — |
| 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | — | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 5 |
| | | 9 | — | — | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | — | 7 | — |
| 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | — | — | 3 | — | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 1 |
| | | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | — |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | — | — | 7 | — | 3 | 3 | — | 1 | — | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| (no detailed figures available for 1957-58) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | 3 | — | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | 4 | — | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | — | 1 | 1 | 7 | — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | — |
| 7 | 8 | 3 | 6 | — | — | 5 | — | 2 | — | — | 1 | 3 | — | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| | | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 16 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 5 | 11 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 13 | 3 |
| | | 5 | 2 | — | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 17 | 2 |
| 237 | 154 | 181 | 98 | 150 | 156 | 86 | 66 | 117 | 78 | 70 | 154 | 123 | 67 | 107 | 126 | 273 | 107 |
| | | 157 | 106 | 88 | 114 | 70 | 58 | 104 | 80 | 38 | 119 | 93 | 54 | 75 | 77 | 237 | 49 |

News Review

KANU Wins Easily In Kenya Elections

The Kenya African National Union, in which James Gichuru and Tom Mboya hold major offices, won a clear victory over the rival Kenya African Democratic Union in Kenya's general elections completed February 27. With four constituencies still unreported, KANU held 16 of 33 possible open elected seats, the KADU nine, and independents four. Ten Europeans, eight Asians, and two Arabs were elected to special seats set aside for them in the multi-racial parliament tentatively scheduled to open April 1. (The Kenya election results will be analyzed in a special report from Nairobi by Dr. Carl Rosberg in the forthcoming April issue of *Africa Report*.)

Afro-Asian Consensus Backs UN Role in Congo

The internal security situation in the Congo sharply deteriorated this month in the wake of the slaying of Patrice Lumumba, as retribution in blood became the order of the day among the country's main political factions. Despite this disturbing new trend—or, more precisely, because of it—there were also some newly hopeful signs that the Congo volcano might yet be capped. These were the major developments:

- The Soviet Union, which blamed Lumumba's murder directly on the laxity of United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and urged the immediate abandonment of the entire UN Congo operation, failed to enlist any support among independent African states for its demand.

- Three separate African initiatives within 48 hours, each cutting across radical-conservative lines, laid the groundwork for development of an African-Asian consensus in favor of bringing order to the Congo by UN-supervised reorganization of its four contending armies into a "non-political force." These were (1) the UAR-Ceylon-Liberia resolution (eventually passed by the Security Council 9-0, with the USSR and France abstaining), (2) the 11-nation Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission's unanimous report, and (3) Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah's seven-point letter of February 18 to Secretary General Hammarskjöld.

Although the African proposals differed on many sticky particulars—for example, there was far from general agreement on Nkrumah's recommendations that all foreign embassies leave the Congo until peace is restored and that the United Nations force be narrowed to Africans and Asians, or on the Conciliation Commission's forthright declara-

tion of support for the legitimacy of the Kasavubu government—agreement was clear-cut on the key point of a UN solution. None of the three took note of the Soviet insistence that the "Congolese people themselves" be allowed to "solve their own vital problems" and that the Soviet Union and "other states friendly to the Congo Republic" come forth to "render all possible assistance and support" directly to the "legitimate" Congo government of Antoine Gizenga.

- The United States, while clearly pursuing a more flexible policy toward the Congolese political situation than heretofore, bluntly warned on February 15 that the US would be bound to defend the UN Charter if the Soviet Union were to undertake so "dangerous and irresponsible a step" as unilateral intervention. In another pointed reference to the Soviet attack on the international organization, President Kennedy recorded a quiet reminder that the Big Powers do not need the UN, and that "any attempt to destroy this system is a blow aimed directly at the independence and security of every small nation."

- In a move apparently sparked by the growing agitation in New York for a political compromise in the Congo, President Kasavubu on February 8 replaced the unorthodox regime of commissioners established by General Joseph Mobutu's military coup four months earlier with a new civilian government, headed by Prime Minister Joseph Ileo. He pointedly left several cabinet posts—including the Ministry of Defense—open for politicians from dissident provinces, and hopefully called a roundtable political conference for about March 1.

- Subsequently, on February 28, Premier Joseph Ileo met with leaders of two secessionist provinces, Moïse Tshombe of Katanga and Albert Kalonji of South Kasai, to explore the possibilities of a political compromise. The three leaders then jointly invited Congo's two other major factional leaders—Antoine Gizenga, now leader of the Lumumba forces, and Anicet Kashamura—to a roundtable conference in the Malgache Republic on March 6. The objective: to forge a political compromise "in an African atmosphere."

As February ended, Secretary General Hammarskjöld faced four immediate problems in implementing the Security Council's February 21 peace directive—(1) how to get his UN Congo army, depleted by recent withdrawals, built up to at least 23,000; (2) how to carry out the investigation of the Lumumba slaying ordered by the Council; (3) what exactly to do to cut off arms supplies and take "all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo";

and (4) how to get the Belgian presence withdrawn.

On March 1, Belgium announced three "urgent measures" to comply in part with UN demands for withdrawal. These measures call for immediate removal of several dozen "isolated" Belgian military advisers from the Congo, "negotiations" with the Katanga Government to insure the security of Belgian nationals and property preparatory to the withdrawal of Belgians serving in Katanga's army, and "further discussion" with UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld on the eventual withdrawal of Belgians working for President Kasavubu's central government, providing Kasavubu approves of such withdrawals.

British Cameroons To Split Allegiances

The February 11 plebiscite in the British Cameroons resulted in a split decision: by a vote of four to one, Southern Cameroonians chose union with the Cameroun Republic, while the Northern Cameroonians decided to rejoin Nigeria. (See "The Other Cameroons: A Reluctant Bride?", *Africa Report*, February 1961.)

Uneasy Compromise In Southern Rhodesia

The conference to decide upon a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia, which appeared to have very gloomy prospects when it opened in London in December, ended in a tenuous compromise agreement on February 7 in Salisbury.

Under the chairmanship of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys, European and African political representatives (with the exception of the European right-wing Dominion Party) agreed to enlarge the Legislative Assembly from 50 members to 65. The extra 15 would be for Africans, who are at present unrepresented in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament.

The proposals would remove the British Government's present right to veto discriminatory legislation in this self-governing colony, establishing instead a Constitutional Council which could delay such legislation and could recommend the repeal or amendment of existing legislation. Voting privileges, to be restricted by income and educational qualifications, would be extended to some 50,000 Africans. Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead has announced that a referendum will be held, probably in June, on the new constitution, but he did not indicate who will be eligible to vote. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the African National Democratic Party, who came to the

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conference with a "one man, one vote" demand, said he would reluctantly accept the extended franchise as a first step toward the National Democratic Party's goal of universal suffrage. But there are already indications that he may be in political difficulties at home because of his decision to compromise.

Belgian Role in Rwanda Protested by Nkrumah

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah has addressed a message to United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjöld urging UN action "to annul the unconstitutional deposition of King Kigiri V of Rwanda." He said the formation of a republican government there by politicians of the Bahutu tribe is "a new example of imperialist and colonialist activities of Belgium in Africa." (See "Rwanda Republic Poses New Problems for UN," *Africa Report*, February 1960.)

Moroccans Walk Out At Addis Ababa

The economic problems of African independence were the main order of business when delegations from 45 African states and associated European powers met in Addis Ababa on February 11 in the third annual session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Africa Hall, the imposing new seven-story headquarters of the Commission, was dedicated by Emperor Haile Selassie.

Although political tensions were always present, the only major issue which came onto the floor of the conference was the quarrel between Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco withdrew its delegation from the hall "with a heavy heart" after the delegates voted overwhelmingly to accept Mauritania's application for membership in the Commission. Morocco holds that Mauritania is only an extension of Morocco and has, so far, blocked its admission to the United Nations proper. (See *Africa Report*, January 1960, page 11.)

M'Ba Wins Sweeping Victory In Gabon

Leon M'Ba was elected President of Gabon in February in the first general elections held in the Republic since independence August 17, 1960. Provisional results gave 191,000 votes for the single "National Union" list out of 193,300 on the register. In each of the nine electoral districts, M'Ba's *Bloc Democratique Gabonaise* and the *Union Democratique et Sociale Gabonaise* combined forces. Under recent constitutional changes, the new chamber has 67 members instead of 40.

Guinea Moves Slowly To Nationalize Utilities

The Government of Guinea announced on January 31 nationalization of the country's two major utility companies. The decision affects the *Societe d'Energie Electrique de Guinee*, which owned and operated almost all the facilities for production and distribution of power in Guinea, and the *Compagnie Africaine de Services Publiques* of Conakry, which purifies and distributes water for the capital. This is the first nationalization of industries since Guinea gained independence in 1958.

Welensky Rejects Northern Rhodesia Plan

The central African political crisis over constitutional reforms proposed by the British Government for Northern Rhodesia had eased slightly as February ended. Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky, who angrily rejected the British Colonial Office's proposals February 21 and called the Federal Assembly into emergency session, opened the door to further negotiation on February 28. He asked the Assembly to enact legislation empowering the federal government to draft every able-bodied man in the Federation for service in the army reserve, but, in a more moderate vein, demobilized several territorial battalions called up a week earlier and invited the British Government to call a new roundtable to discuss alternative proposals.

Meanwhile, the principal African representatives to the three-week constitutional conference which deadlocked in London in February were also dissatisfied with the new proposals—but more quietly so. It was clearly the African strategy to lie low and give Welensky (1) rope to hang himself, and (2) no excuse to impose an emergency. Both Kenneth Kaunda, head of the United National Independence Party, and Harry Nkumbula, leader of the African National Congress, attacked the new British proposals as inadequate, but placed the blame on the right wing elements in the British Government, not on Colonial Secretary Macleod.

The complex compromise proposals introduced unilaterally by Macleod in the wake of the conference breakdown call for enlargement of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council to 45 members, about double its present size. Under a "triple-15" formula purposefully aimed at keeping political lines open between the races, 15 Rhodesian legislators would be elected on an "upper roll," another 15 on a "lower roll" of African electors from an expanded list, and a final 15 from both rolls. It gives the Africans (who

outnumber the whites by about 2,200,000 to 72,000) greater legislative representation, but not the majority they sought. African voters would probably be increased from about 10,000 (7,617 actually registered in 1959) to some 70,000, with property holdings, income and level of education the determining factors.

Tito Tours Africa, Visiting Seven Capitals

President Tito of Yugoslavia left Belgrade on February 13 on the first stage of a tour of Africa expected to last seven or eight weeks. He is paying official visits to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Morocco, Tunisia, and an unofficial visit to the United Arab Republic.

Harsh Portuguese Rule Challenged in Angola

Recent news filtering out through the heavy blanket of censorship imposed by Angola portrays a country of anxious waiting despite the swift suppression of an armed uprising against the regime on February 4-5. The brief rebellion, apparently timed to coincide with the seizure of the liner *Santa Maria*, was the first major demonstration of African nationalism in Portugal's largest and richest overseas possession. Details are still scarce, but the official death toll is now set at 31; both Africans and whites participated.

Captain Enrique de Malta Galvao, the rebel captain who kept the *Santa Maria* in the headlines for a fortnight, is a well-known figure in Portuguese Africa. He was imprisoned for more than a decade after the government suppressed a report he filed in 1947 detailing the inefficiencies, corruption, and other evils of the forced labor system existing in Angola. Although the Portuguese Government had commissioned Galvao to make the study, it was promptly suppressed after presentation to the National Assembly in 1947 and has never been made public.

Portuguese officials in the Angolan capital of Luanda now concede that the outburst of trouble in February was carefully planned, but they insist that it was inspired from outside. Convinced that administrative control of the 4,100,000 Angolans is so pervasive that any serious plot brewing inside would have been known in advance, the government contends that the organizers and many of the participants infiltrated from the neighboring Congo Republic. Congo President Joseph Kasavubu's Bakongo tribe straddles the Congo-Angola border, and Angolan nationalist organizations have been publicly organizing in Leopoldville ever since the Congo became independent in June.

How Seven States Were Born in French West Africa

(Continued from page 7)

faction of the *Parti Progressiste du Soudan* led by Hammadoun Dicko attempted to hold out and to run in the elections on an anti-federalist platform; but it was soundly defeated and later integrated into the Soudan RDA also. Meanwhile, the Senegal UPS, long-time ally of the *Parti Progressiste du Soudan*, which had joined with the Soudanese RDA in the new *Parti de la Federation Africaine*, was faced with a French-encouraged, right-wing, anti-federalist split from the UPS, called the *Parti de Solidarite Senegalaise*. As in Soudan, this opposition group was soundly defeated at the elections and ultimately rejoined the UPS. There were also two parties to the left of UPS in Senegal, which refused to support the establishment of the Federation of Mali: these were PRA-Senegal, a split-off from the UPS led by Ly Abdoulaye, which was close to the Guinea RDA, and the *Parti Africain de l'Independence*.

Mali Under Attack

The *Parti de la Federation Africaine* thus eventually grouped the Soudanese RDA, which was now unopposed in Soudan, the Senegalese UPS which was very largely the majority party in Senegal, plus the opposition parties in Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, and Mauritania.

Mali, from the beginning, was attacked on all sides. The French saw the federation as a step which inevitably would lead to rapid independence. Houphouet shared this view and also resented the break with his leadership. Guinea resented the fact that the leaders of Mali had voted "yes" in the Referendum and had not supported Guinea in its hour of need after the Referendum. There was considerable suspicion in Conakry that Mali was a neo-colonialist maneuver to surround Guinea, engineered by clever French tacticians.

The establishment of Mali nevertheless forced Houphouet-Boigny to modify his position. If he was to get Upper Volta and Dahomey to break with Mali, he had to make some gesture to meet the economic needs of these territories, needs which were at least in part responsible for their initial adhesion to Mali. Opposed as he was to a federation, Houphouet now conceived the idea of a loose confederation of the four states in the eastern half of French West Africa (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey) to become the *Conseil de l'Entente*.

Thus, with the re-alignment of the West African states into Mali and the *Entente*, there also came re-alignment of parties. Three of the *Entente* states had RDA governments and the fourth, Dahomey, was a co-

alition government which included the RDA. The party of Mali, the *Parti de la Federation Africaine*, and the party of the *Entente*, the RDA, each tried to secure collaboration of opposition elements in the other's territory. PFA affiliates existed in Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey and the RDA attempted links with the *Parti de Solidarite Senegalaise* in Senegal and with Hammandoun Dicko in Soudan. Similarly, both the Mali and *Entente* leaders moved to strengthen their regimes by absorbing or outlawing opposition parties that were linked with the other camp. None of these governments felt they could allow party structures full freedom of maneuver since they all regarded opposition parties as "foreign agents".

With the creation of Mali and the *Entente*, the French Community faced a new question: what kind of juridical recognition should be given to these competing structures? The *Conseil de l'Entente*, presenting itself as nothing more than a loose alliance, did not ask for juridical recognition, indeed was opposed to it. But Mali—with a government, a Prime Minister, and a Federal Assembly—wished to be regarded as a single unit and to be accorded official recognition as such by the French Republic. Houphouet-Boigny, speaking for the *Entente*, was violently opposed to the recognition of the Mali Federation by France.

Mali and the Community

At the very first meeting of the Prime Ministers of the member states of the Community in May 1959 in Paris, the question was posed in a subtle manner. Mali's Prime Minister Modibo Keita wished to attend the meeting, but Mali was not a member state of the Community. The French devised a temporary compromise. They asked Modibo Keita also to assume the position of Prime Minister of the Soudan, which he had left to one of his subordinates, and to circumvent the recognition issue by attending the meeting in this capacity. This compromise was temporarily accepted, but the question of Mali's status remained open.

In July 1959, at the Congress of the *Parti de la Federation Africaine* in Dakar, the central issue was the pace at which Mali should go forward to independence. Both the Soudanese and the Senegalese were agreed that membership in the Community was merely a step towards independence, and the formula finally devised was that Mali would negotiate with France for the revision of the Community into a multi-national confederation composed of independent states. Mali would not, however, use the means provided for in the de Gaulle constitution—that of a popu-

lar referendum calling for independence—because there was no desire to repeat the traumatic Guinea separation from France. Instead, Senegal and Soudan would take advantage of a loophole discovered in the constitution and negotiate a transfer of powers with France. The Soudanese pressed for early negotiations, but the Senegalese were somewhat reluctant to undertake the next step. Thus, when the Community Prime Ministers met shortly thereafter in Tananarive, the expected blow-up between Houphouet and the Mali leaders did not occur. The question of Mali's status was again postponed.

Labor's Changing Political Role

At the point of the Referendum, there were trade-unionists aligned with each of the major political groupings—that of Mali, the *Entente*, and Guinea. Many more trade-unionists were pro-Guinea or pro-Mali than pro-*Entente*, however. The Guinea UGTAN, headed by Sekou Toure, was in total accord with the Guinea political party, the RDA. The Soudan trade-union had also quietly called for a "no" vote on the Referendum in accordance with the UGTAN inter-territorial position, but it did not take a public stand against the political line of the Soudan RDA. The one Soudan trade-unionist who openly took a position in favor of the "no" vote, Minister of Labor Diallo Abdoulaye, was expelled to Guinea immediately after the Referendum. The Ivory Coast trade-unions, or at least the majority of elements within them, remained in line behind Houphouet. In Niger, where Bakary Djibo headed both the trade union movement and the local PRA affiliate, the trade-union movement was inevitably in direct opposition to the party which attained power, the RDA.

In Dahomey, trade-union elements tended to be heavily RDA but from the party's federalist wing. Because of the multiple-party system of Dahomey, the trade-unions have been able to maintain a greater degree of independence from the political party structures than in neighboring countries. In Upper Volta, where the party structure was still relatively unstabilized and the trade-unions relatively weak, the problem of labor's political role has been postponed.

In Senegal, where the predominant UPS split over the Referendum, the Secretary-General of the split off section, PRA-Senegal, was also the leader of UGTAN, both in Senegal and on an inter-territorial basis, Gueye Abdoulaye. Clearly this posed a dangerous situation for the Senegalese Government, and a good deal of pressure was placed on the Senegal UGTAN to fall in line. UGTAN responded by moving its inter-terri-

(Continued on page 15)

Searchlights Through the Umbra

By HARVEY GLICKMAN*

Book Editor

Common Sense About Africa, by Anthony Sampson (NY: Macmillan, 1960), 175 pages, \$2.95.

Independence for Africa, by Gwen-dolen M. Carter (NY: Praeger, 1960), 172 pages, \$4.50 cloth, \$1.65 paper.

An Atlas of Africa, by J. F. Horrabin (NY: Praeger, 1961), 123 pages, \$3.50 cloth, \$1.45 paper.

The Reluctant African, by Louis E. Lomax (NY: Harper, 1960), 117 pages, \$2.95.

Kwame Nkrumah and the Future of Africa, by John Phillips (NY: Praeger, 1961), 272 pages, \$5.50.

Although weary librarians (and reviewers?) may plead for a temporary moratorium on surface-skimming "introductions to Africa," the general reader, faced with newspaper debris from the almost daily political explosions in Africa, demands renewed attempts to examine, classify, and comprehend the flow of events. The principal usefulness of the political introduction lies, of course, in its ability to reveal "what's going on"—no simple task. It succeeds, however, when it focuses on the engines of change, when it identifies the component parts and explains the process and consequences of their intermeshing. Limited in space, bound by the requirements of "general" readership, the author of an "introduction" must depend on imaginative similes, flashes of insight, and confident assertion. In short, the perfect introduction is a searchlight, which illuminates the essentials of safe passage through the umbra of confused events.


Nationalism is Theme

Measured by this standard, only Mr. Sampson and Professor Carter—of the above mentioned covey of authors—pass the test, though Mr. Horrabin has written and drawn a "pre-introduction," which should make a pleasant guide to armchair experts. Mr. Sampson writes within the restrictions imposed by the "Common Sense series" ("in a manner immediately intelligible to any man or woman—or, for that matter, to any boy or girl—of average education") and Miss Carter warns that her chapters serve merely "to awaken interest," but neither need apologize for their labors in sophisticated circles.

Nationalism — naturally — is the theme of both surveys. Its origins in the impact of the West, its development amid the cross-currents of social change, and its manifold results are deftly portrayed. Mr. Sampson, a

former editor of *Drum*, renders particular service by sprinkling his text with personal observations which summarize pages of description in an instant. His experience permits most striking characterizations of government in British Africa—"a uniform white sheet over the black life underneath"—and of policy in South Africa—"the desperation, the heroic, and perhaps suicidal element of apartheid."

Mr. Sampson also tries his hand at broad comparisons in a series of provocative chapters at the start. Perhaps most intriguing is his explanation of the historical necessity for pan-Africanism to arise first outside Africa and for *negritude* to remain primarily a French and not a British ideal. Both tendencies sprang from Africans partially assimilated by alien cultures in France, America, and the West Indies "and thus also



more cut off from their people." These circumstances permitted vivid realization of Africa and its distinctiveness as an objective entity.

In pursuing the corollary theme of national independence, Miss Carter (who earlier wrote a modern classic on South Africa, *The Politics of Inequality*) covers more ground with no apparent loss of depth. In each chapter she surveys a territory, building the discussion around the recreation of some significant event, e.g., a rally, a flight over Kariba, etc. Some readers may balk at the periodic "as I was saying to Tom Mboya" approach, but on the whole Miss Carter puts her vignette technique to surprisingly profound use.

She takes pains to emphasize that changes occur at many levels. "There are the interactions between the traditional leaders, the tribal chiefs or councils of elders, and the new national movements; between ethnic groups striving for superiority as their territory approaches self-government; and, particularly in East and Central Africa, between African majorities and long-established white, Asian and Arab minorities." In facing up to the inevitable "what will happen?" Miss Carter displays more confidence than Mr. Sampson about the possibilities of pan-African federalism. She observes that the concept

of Africa remains overriding for Africans because it affirms a bond of solidarity that strengthens them against white authorities. (The very idea of Africa makes moral demands on the advanced civilization that tormented that continent for so long.) Finally, the artificiality of colonial boundaries at present enhances the possibility that ways to transcend them can be found by determined pan-Africanist leaders.

Maps are Useful

To all this, the distinguished cartographer J. F. Horrabin adds 50 small maps that recreate problems of past, present, and future. Happily, he decided to include linguistic, topographical, and archaeological materials, which contribute desirable dimension to the outline of political history. The latter, incidentally, does not pretend to be objective. "It has been drawn and written in the fixed conviction that Europeans—and Americans—owe Africans a big debt . . ."

Mr. Lomax and Professor Phillips traverse the same areas, but in a less satisfactory manner. Mr. Lomax is a Negro journalist—"the first member of his race to appear on television as a newsmen." After a quick trip through a few parts of Africa last summer, he has produced a distended chronicle, which judicious editing and some careful research might have transformed into a valuable magazine article. He was struck by the intensity of racial feeling among Africans against white people. Perhaps his own successful career and the methods and goals of his race in the United States lead Mr. Lomax to assume that any road other than that of racial integration and vigorous anti-Communism is well-nigh immoral. In any case, the result is an exclamatory tour of the hotbeds of revolution in Cairo, Salisbury, and Johannesburg. Although he demonstrates some shoddy history and some superficial philosophy, Mr. Lomax is a good, often exciting, reporter. To his credit, he "foresaw" the recent Ethiopian uprising. At the very least, the gist of his report is disturbing.

Professor Phillips, formerly at the University College of Ghana, has actually written two short books—a rather pedestrian summary of political trends in the various African territories and an adulatory discussion of the rise and influence of Dr. Nkrumah. Windy style and commonplace judgments prevail, but his excursion into the possibilities of "Bantustans" in South Africa is noteworthy, if only as an example of soft-headed reasoning. A South African by birth and an ecologist by training, Professor Phillips would promote Bantustans if such a policy is "sin-

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cerely and generously" applied. He also supports what is at the apex of that policy, representation for the Bantu in a true Union of South Africa. But ask why should Africans want "representation" at all, if their Bantustans are really free and independent. Ask the reverse also: why create Bantustans, if Africans require representation in a multi-racial union? There is no answer except that even in theory Bantustans demand some form of white domination.

Becoming More Civilized, A Psychological Exploration, by Leonard W. Doob (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 333 pages, \$6.

Inexorably, the burgeoning concern with political "modernization" leads to attempts to describe and understand the psychological processes that lie behind it. Actually, we know quite a bit about what the anthropologists call "acculturation" and it is certainly time to collate previous research with the data on Africa. Professor Doob of Yale, well-known in the field of opinion and attitude research, courageously makes the first deliberate endeavor to compare similar studies in a variety of contexts (e.g., among American Indians, Arabs, Jamaicans) in order to achieve a high level of generalization. Unfortunately for the uninitiated, this requires a high degree of abstraction too.

The book is as much concerned with method as with content, so the going may get heavy, but the studious reader has a staunch ally in the author, who writes with wit and vigor. Much of the material will repay concentration, for Professor Doob sketches and clarifies a set of general answers to two fundamental questions: why do people become more civilized in certain respects and what happens to them as they become so? Twenty-seven hypotheses and numerous accompanying corollaries emerge, all surrounding the theme of changes in motives and goals. In other words, people change when they experience dissatisfaction with previous patterns of existence. Stated so baldly, the thesis appears banal, but, once recognized, it permits a point of departure for delineating the psychological network that links changes in personality, skills and values to modifications of behavior.

Two sections are particularly suggestive. At the outset, Professor Doob builds a model of the "attributes of less civilized people" in a sympathetic yet detached manner. This is recommended to all those who feel human behavior is too diverse to generalize about and to those who regard comparisons of primitivity with modernity as bound to be patronizing. Both notions are shown to be untrue. The conclusion that "all societies eventually become civilized in a distinctive manner or perish" follows from the weight of the evidence evaluated and should promote further fruitful debate.

The Tragedy of Apartheid, by Norman Phillips (NY: David McKay, 1960), 217 pages, \$4.00.

Norman Phillips, the foreign news editor of the *Toronto Star*, went to South Africa during the emergency last year, and had to leave hastily after a brief imprisonment for his reporting. He has written a flat but sometimes gripping account of the situation he encountered, a book that is best when it is least pretentious.

The best chapters are the pure reporting, where Phillips describes the disturbances in Johannesburg and Cape Town, the confusion attending the government's first wave of arrests, and his own jail-

ing. This is better reporting than American papers offered, for the most part.

But Phillips, whose own analysis of the history and causes of the South African situation is a hasty job, never really got beneath the surface. Plainly he never knew any Afrikaners, and since they rule the country, this is a crucial defect. He cannot assert that the situation made this impossible, for the situation did not compel him to write a book which claims to explain the whole story.

—Adam Clymer.

Yet, as Professor Doob admits, his study is by way of exploration; it does not represent a break-through. As long as similar motives can account for disparate responses and as long as many of the conclusions laboriously reached seem to reproduce "common sense," then efforts like Professor Doob's will continue to appeal only to the scholar and to the fastidious layman.

The Birth of a Dilemma, the Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia, by Philip Mason (NY: Oxford University Press, 1958), 366 pages, \$4.75.

The Two Nations, Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, by Richard Gray (NY: Oxford University Press, 1960), 373 pages, \$6.75.

Central African Emergency, by Clyde Sanger (London: Heinemann, 1960), 343 pages, 30s.

Nyasaland, the Economics of Federation, by Arthur Hazlewood and P. D. Henderson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), 91 pages, 10s. 6d.

One of the causes of "muddling through" is probably the fact that the British write their problems to death. In the number of words devoted to its solution, the Central African puzzle by now undoubtedly rivals "the Indian Question" of the inter-war years. All this attention also produces a staggeringly heterogeneous pile of printed materials—from pamphlets to tomes and from polemics to statistics—but it always yields some fine examples of the application of hard heads to tough matter. Within the latter category, Mr. Mason—an "old India hand" and now Director of the Institute of Race Relations—and Dr. Gray have put together an excellent popular history and analysis of race relations and its attendant strains in Central Africa.

The two books comprise the first two-thirds of a trilogy on the Federation executed for the Institute of Race Relations and financed by the Rockefeller Foundation. (The final book, also by Mr. Mason, *Year of*

Decision 1960, has already been reviewed here; see *Africa Report*, December 1960.) Taken together, they provide a record that indicates anything but rosy prospects for a meaningful partnership of the races in the Federation in its current circumstances. Neither the brilliance of Mr. Mason's presentation of the psychological basis for the fears of the Europeans, nor his worldly comprehension of the universal, natural forces involved in the contact of different cultures can erase the picture of European hypocrisy that emerges. In early Rhodesia "to civilize" meant to draft labor, even by force and "to develop" meant to sequester farmland, by strength and by guile. After tracing the white man's progress—over the bodies of Matabele and Mashona opposition—Mr. Mason discusses the spread of "the roots of strife": land rights, labor needs, racial separation, and a double legal standard.

Dr. Gray, a more "suspicious" visitor to Africa by Mr. Mason's admission, continues a careful examination of policies that grew out of these sources of conflict after 1918. He clearly shows that divergent traditions of race relations developed in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, finding a meeting ground in Northern Rhodesia. Until recently the goals of "segregation" and "trusteeship" clashed there most dramatically. Hope might be discovered in the fact that after 1918 the general policy in race relations shifted from outright segregation to a recognition of the necessity of contact and hesitant attempts at ameliorating its difficulties.

But both Mr. Mason and Dr. Gray leave little room for expectation. "The great problem of Rhodesia," the former notes, "was how to maintain the social gap without denying the native all chances of education and development." And the latter concludes: "By 1953 the chances of creating a co-operation between European and African leaders had become terrifyingly slender, the one concrete attempt had ended in failure, and Europeans were faced with the problem

not of an emergent elite but of an unpredictable and increasingly hostile proletariat in the Rhodesias and a united national movement in Nyasaland."

Mr. Sanger adds nothing by way of history but contributes some excellent journalism in his straightforward analysis of the recent crisis. A number of interviews with leading personalities, exposing the cruel dilemmas that beset native radicals and conservatives, and an appendix on the shortcomings of the Rhodesian press remain especially useful. Messrs. Hazlewood and Henderson, both Oxford dons, conclude a short statistical survey by substantially denying virtually all the claims of economic advantage that would accrue to Nyasaland under Federation. A surprising note of warning protrudes: "If Nyasaland had in fact been associated with Northern Rhodesia alone, the gains referred to [redistribution of territorial income] would almost certainly have been substantially larger." Constitutional conferees please note.

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NOTES:

1. *The New Nations of West Africa*, edited by Robert Theobald (NY: H. W. Wilson Co., "The Reference Shelf," v. 32, no. 2, 1960), 179 pages, \$2.50. A collection of newspaper and magazine articles—some complete and some reduced—loosely grouped around current problems. Useful for background review and for student "term papers." Bibliography, but no maps.

2. *Africa—A World in Progress*, An American Family in West Africa, by Virginia Cone (NY: Exposition Press, 1960), 99 pages, \$3. A good-humored report and travelogue—an "Inside Ghana" for visiting professors. Both the author and her husband teach history at Purdue and they were the first Americans to teach in Ghana's Extra-Mural Studies Program.

3. *La secta del Bwiti en la Guinea Espanola*, by Antonio de Veciana Viladach (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1958), 63 pages, 25 ptas. A digest of information on the Mbueti Sect, a syncretistic religious movement with political overtones which has been active in Spanish Guinea, Gabon, and even Paris.

The CP in South Africa

(Continued from page 6)

its patient attitude of the last few years.

The Communists in the ANC will have to match the Pan-Africanist Congress's revolutionary recipe if they hope to have the organization they have so painstakingly infiltrated stay in the competition—even though they might prefer to have open rebellion wait a few more years for their own purposes.

Seven States From French West Africa

(Continued from page 12)

torial headquarters to Conakry, which only worsened the situation. Henceforth the Senegalese Government saw UGTAN as an agent of a foreign government, i.e., Guinea. A group of Senegalese trade-unionists close to the Senghor party in its old pre-fusion version, the *Bloc Democratique Senegalaise*, began to talk of splitting with UGTAN. As the *Parti de la Federation Africaine* Congress opened in July 1959, there were two trade union groups in Senegal—UGTAN-Orthodoxe and the pro-government UGTAN-Autonome led by Cisse Aliouane. The Soudanese, following the federalist Congress, exerted sufficient pressure on the Senegalese to bring about a temporary reunion and at the Bamako meeting of UGTAN in July 1959, the movement appeared as strong as it had ever been. This surface unity was misleading, however, for the process of national consolidation was to have its inevitable impact on all inter-territorial functional groupings—the trade unions as well as youth, students' and women's movements. Each of the new governments pressed to bring the local units of these inter-territorial movements into line. Thus, the political disintegration of the federation led inevitably to the disintegration of the political party structure which had held it together, the RDA, and of the trade-union and youth structures. This is not to say that the sentiment for unity disappeared or even the practical contacts, but there was inevitably a withdrawal, bit by bit, from the inter-territorial structures—RDA, UGTAN, and CJA.

The Houphouet-Mali battle reached its climax at the St. Louis meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Community in September 1959. The French, by this time, had decided that their early opposition to Mali was a tactical error and had decided to play the card of Senghor. One of the considerations undoubtedly was the long Soudan border with Algeria; another was the rapid disintegration of colonial empires elsewhere in Africa and France's reluctant recognition that independence in some form was inevitable. At St. Louis, de Gaulle gave juridical recognition to Mali and indicated that negotiations would be undertaken with the leaders of Mali for independence within the Community.

Houphouet, who had warned before the Tananarive meeting that he was not interested in a Commonwealth *a la francaise*, was reportedly astonished by de Gaulle's new position, about which he had not been forewarned. Retiring in dignity, he decided to prepare the day of his revenge. The accords signed between Mali and

France (and Madagascar and France) in early 1960 granted each of these states full independence within the Community, but allowed for continuing close economic and defense ties with France. These accords were much criticized by nationalists of the Guinea persuasion, including PRA-Senegal, within Senegal. Meanwhile, Upper Volta held a party congress in spring 1960, which ended in a call for early independence—the first time that an *Entente* state had made such a demand since the Referendum.

This premature explosion was not followed through immediately. But once the Mali negotiations were completed and officially announced, the four states of the *Entente* asked France, through their spokesman Houphouet-Boigny, for immediate independence without prior negotiation of accords—thus taking a position more extreme than that of Mali and one which met the full demands of the more radical nationalist critics of the Mali format. By this single step, Houphouet sought to buy back much of his lost prestige in French Africa, knowing full well that the French could not possibly oppose such a demand. The consternated French attempted for a few weeks to equivocate, but eventually had to concede gracefully.

The independence of the four *Entente* states in early August led to immediate pressure within Mali for the revision of the Mali-French accords. One of the complex of causes involved in the breakdown of the Mali Federation in late August was Mali's loss of its *avant-garde* status, one of the most important factors holding together two such disparate groups as the Soudan-RDA and the Senghor forces in Senegal.

In brief summary, it can thus be said that Guinea independence led to Mali independence, which led to *Entente* independence. Had the Guineans not voted "no" in the Referendum and taken so firm a position in the early days of independence, it is doubtful that the Soudanese would have pushed the Senegalese as fast toward the road to independence. Had Mali not successfully negotiated its treaty with France, the *Entente* states would neither have felt the pique nor the push to demand full independence at this time. And, of course, the militancy of the *Entente* reaction to the Mali accords inevitably created immediate pressure for revision of the Mali position. The race to independence after 1958 was an accelerating one in which all the elements were caught in a maelstrom, and none could act independently of the others. It will be difficult, though not impossible, to rebuild the unifying structures which have now been broken.

"Mixed" Economic Development in Ghana

To nationalize or not to nationalize? The newly independent country, looking at the legacy of colonial rule, can rarely answer the question in economic terms alone. The political considerations are often more pressing and always more charged with emotion. Dr. Nkrumah is the latest to find himself steering a tricky course between the demands of the more extreme left wing among his supporters and his need to encourage foreign investment. He is determined that Ghana's socialist economy should allow mixed development rather than be pushed into hasty and wholesale nationalization. This is illustrated by his latest move with five of Ghana's foreign-owned gold mines.

He has stepped in ahead of a proposed Bill, the terms of which would certainly frighten off the foreign

investor, by offering a purchase arranged through London bankers. The Ghana Government had awarded wage increases which, the companies claimed, made their further operations unprofitable, so they proposed to close down. Ghana was not prepared to subsidize them, yet was unwilling to see the workers unemployed. The offer to buy is the sensible answer, which it is thought the companies will accept.

Dr. Nkrumah has had something of a running battle in this matter for the past few months, with emotion and doctrine both bumping him in his attempt to keep to a definable course. In countries where emotion is in command, outright expropriation of the foreign company has usually been the answer. In China, the Communists, following a second course, insisted on foreign firms continuing in unprofitable business to the point where there were no longer any assets to take over. A third possibility, where emotions demand some action, is nationalization of some enterprises on reasonable and negotiated terms.

Even then it is not easy to keep a balance. Either the government's intentions are exaggerated and are thought to herald complete and speedy socialism; or the foreign company holds out for more than it can be given in the circumstances. There has to be political awareness on both sides. And even if the companies are nationalized with no loss of good will, most countries find that the foreign investor tends to mark time for a little, waiting for both political and economic stability. By now the need for foreign investment as an aid to the economy is recognized by most governments in the newly emerged countries. The danger is that, seen from Britain, without a fine sense of the differences between socialist and Communist in the often turbulent conditions of revolution, the foreign investor reaches too hasty a conclusion. Any nationalizers can sound very like Communists.

Dr. Nkrumah is well aware of this. He has seen how India has shifted over the years from a doctrinaire foundation towards greater flexibility. Unlike India, he sees no prospect in Ghana of the speedy growth of indigenous capitalism. Foreign confidence in his intentions and in Ghana's stability depends therefore on government measures. His offer to take over the gold mines, on reasonable terms, is to that extent a sign of moderation.

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Calendar...

February 20-March 19: An exhibition of paintings by Jean N. Luvwezo, a Congolese student at Princeton University, at the Coffee Mill, a restaurant at 46 West 56th Street, New York City.

The University of Minnesota announces a spring lecture series on "The African Character." **March 13:** The Tribal African and His World (Philip Gulliver, African Studies Program, Boston University); **March 22:** The Urban African and His World (William Bascom, Department of Anthropology, University of California); **March 29:** Multi-Racial Africa (Vernon McKay, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins); **April 5:** African Art (Martin Friedman, Walker Art Center, Minneapolis); **April 12:** African Music (Alan P. Merriam, Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University); **April 19:** African Literature and the Mass Media (Ruth C. Sloan, Ruth Sloan Associates, Inc., Washington DC); **April 26:** The African Intellectual (Elliott Skinner, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, New York University); **May 3:** The Economic Man (Paul J. Bohannon, African Studies Program, Northwestern University); **May 10:** Four African Political Leaders and Their Views of the World (Gwendolen Carter, Department of Government, Smith College); **May 17:** The Challenge of Africa (Henry Bretton, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan). For details, write the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14, Minnesota.

April 15: Annual celebration of Africa Freedom Day at Hunter College, New York City, sponsored by the American Committee on Africa. Featured will be speakers from remaining colonial areas, African delegates to the UN, prominent Americans, and leading entertainers. For details, write the American Committee on Africa, 801 Second Avenue, New York City.

A photographic exhibit on Africa, prepared by the Twentieth Century Fund, is being circulated by the Smithsonian Institution. For information on fees and bookings, write Mrs. John A. Pope, Chief, Traveling Exhibition Service, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.

October 20-22: Fourth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, the organization of American scholars specializing on Africa, at the Roosevelt Hotel, New York City. For information, write African Studies Association, 409 West 117th Street, New York 27, New York.

October 23-26: Eighth National Conference of the United States National Commission for UNESCO, at Boston University, to discuss "Africa and the US: Images and Realities." Special attention will be given to education, science, technology, mass media, and the arts. Attendance by invitation. For details, write the United States National Commission for UNESCO, Department of State, Washington 25, DC.

"Africa Report" is published by the African-American Institute, a private, non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia and devoted to establishing closer bonds between the peoples of Africa and the United States. Other activities of the institute include scholarship programs, teacher placement in Africa, and a variety of lecture, information and visitor services.

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